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1987, Assessments and Suggestions

First registered: 2018-02-01;     since, no change    
1. Introduction: why 1987? The fifties of Korea may count three epochal events of Korea in their life time: Protests and massacre at Gwangju in 1980, Protests and constitutional change in 1987, and Financial Crisis and IMF rescue in 1997 except the latest one of impeachment of president Park in 2017. Among the three, it would be no question that the 1987 event is the only happy one or at least not a tragic one. Truly in 1987 people voiced and succeeded to get back their rights to vote directly in presidential election. Although the coming presidential election resulted in the winning of the ruling political group which reached power by the coup d'eta and committed massacres at Gwangju in 1980, at least the 1987 event was a sign of advance of Korea's democracy. Indeed, since then, Korea experienced three times of the change in the ruling parties in presidential elections: 1997, 2008, and 2017. Given the Huntington's criteria of democratization that require at least two times of the change in the ruling party, Korea can be relieved and deserved to be proud to have a stable democratic polity. The tragic aftermaths of Jasmine Revolution of 2010-2011 vindicate that transition to a stable democratic regime is never guaranteed in spite of a huge mobilization of people toward democracy. So it is not difficult to understand that Korean people see the 1987 as a demarcation year of the latest Korean history. Some Korean scholars happened to resort to the 1987 as a determining moment of Korea's trajectory since then both in politics and economy. They express their regret that the democratic change since 1987 was not democratic enough to force economic policies toward economic democracy and rather gave economic liberalization programs more room to maneuver which resulted in the 1997 financial crisis. Though it is not easy what people think of the year 1987, a series of candle protests for the impeachment of president Park from late 2016 to early 2017 probably serve as a reminder of the 1987 memory. Though the 1987 protests achieved only half the people's wish since the then ruling party won the presidential election, the 2017 ones resulted in the change of the ruling group by sweeping margin in the presidential election. So it is hypothetically feasible that Korean people may see the 2017 as a fulfillment of the 1987 wishes prolonged for thirty years. Coincidentally a latest movie titled 1987 is attracting a broad range of audiences rapidly and more than just a movie but a social phenomena. People seem to pilgrimage to the 1987 through the movie and tribute their 2017 achievement to the people of 1987 who sacrificed and dedicated themselves to Korean democracy and eventually enabled the 2017 democratic feat. Though surely it is a spiritual uplift to imagine a seemingly political happy tale of 1987 in connection with 1997 (or vice versa), the objective situation of Korea is not at all such a thing to be pervaded by optimism. Rather the contrary is more of truth. The disillusion that would displace the political fever may be even harsh and may corner people into a pessimistic ends and discourage them into a sarcastic individualism. Let alone security concerns raised from the North Korea's continued military provocations such as missiles and nuclear warheads (though they are serious but to an extent beyond Korea's influence), people feel devastated by low or undesirable performances of the economy. The twenties and thirties are severely hit by the insufficient job openings that they want (considering high rates of college enrollments), and they have to start their social carrier with college tuition debts reimbursements of which should continue to be made in years and which suppress their financial forecast to a gloomy one. Not the least, the twenties and thirties suffer from high residential and parenting costs and simply they deter marriage and at least pregnancy in spite of marriage. The twenties and thirties sarcastically call themselves 'N-po generation', meaning a generation that only have to give up all. The opposite age group of the sixties and older records top rates of suicides among OECD countries, which are supposed to be due to poverty and consequent mental fragility. The middle aged people of forties and fifties are not at all economically safe: companies do not provide life-long employment and middle-aged people are forced to venture into self-employing businesses which are already crowded and highly likely to fail. The economic conundrum and the peacefully-strengthened democracy of Korea defy the common belief that democratization draws on a certain degree of economic stability. And it is quite a strong point of Korea to pursue democracy peacefully in spite of economic difficulties. But Korea should not be negligent of the danger of the breach between democracy and economic realities and should be remind of a general wisdom that democracy is conditional on solid economic fundamentals. And more than that, it should be also questioned that Korean democracy per se is stable enough to be free of or at least to withstand any constitutional challenge such as happened during Park's presidency and resulted in impeachment. Peaceful recovering from such constitutional challenges is surely better than none, but months-long uncertainty and instability of the state and demonstrations and protests of the people on the street reveals that Korea still lacks problem solving institutions or institutional intermediaries or representatives are not capable of prevent crisis preemptively or of dealing with crisis legitimately in accommodation of people's wishes. This failure or invisibility of exiting institutions should not be obscured by a romanticized optimism drawing on the successful change of the ruling party in the latest presidential election. Herein lies an imperative that this essay stands by. This essay argues that economic fundamentals of Korea should be strengthened as a necessary condition of the current democratic state and also a further sophistication of democratic institutions should be taken into consideration as a sufficient condition. The discussion on economy and politics follow in the following sections each. 2. Economy in review There are two huge down-turns in the Korea economy in decades: first the 1979 crisis (less known, particularly obscured by the then president Park's demise, personally and politically) and second the 1997 crisis. The former one was due to the glut of overcapacity in heavy and chemical sectors those sectors nurtured and driven by Park's regime and rather easily covered up by the following military regime thanks to the heavy, and not necessarily market- and rule- based, intervention of the government in restructuring the sectors and the economy continued to grow rapidly. So the 1979 crisis did not leave much scars or was forgotten easily. But the liberalization programs started or at least were attempted to be installed or fused into the characteristic developmental state. And it is the 1980s when neo-liberalization programs embarked on US and UK each under Reagan and Thatcher. The liberalization of the 1980s could not be fully implemented because of hard grips of the military authoritarian regime internally and of the cold war externally. But the 1987 democratization of Korea and the collapse of the old communist block in the late 1980s worked as game-changing moments. International economic and financial institutes and the US consulted with Korea and recommended to accept liberalization measures and Korea hurried to take such measures without taking time to consider the effects, particularly to have membership in OECD. Such measures are particularly about liberalization of capital flows and so Korean financial intermediaries became rapidly absorbed into and so vulnerable to the international financial flows, which unluckily or unavoidably led to the abrupt liquidation and caused 1997 financial crisis. Contrary to the 1979 crisis which was contained in domestic scope, the 1997 crisis let Korean government totally incapable and draw on the IMF rescue package. And the then IMF rescue package was so called based on Washington Consensus which recommended serious restructuring or even to some degree a punishment of inflation afflicted Latin American countries like sharp interest rates increases and currency depreciation. This restructuring surely left big scars on the Korean economy. High growth regime collapsed abruptly and so did not allow for a preparation of an alternative economic system. The liberalist as well as democratic KIM Daejung government almost fully accepted IMF recommendations or could not help but to do so. Around the corner of 1997, Korea's developmental state surely faded out and added many features of a neoliberal kind which was not seriously prepared or discussed on but almost forced. However, it is hard to define the Korean economy as a neoliberal one. The legacy of developmental state pervades the society: the government is able to force corporations to make non-legitimate decisions, which was revealed recently during the Park's presidency and resulted as the impeachment of Park. Korea is still far from the rule of law as the premise of a liberal state. Any party of a higher bargaining power can do and tend to exercise coercion on the other party of a lower power beyond contract terms, which surely disturb the operation of the market. It is least feasible to call for welfare regime to describe the Korean economy. In developmental state, growing jobs in themselves served as welfare provision and formal welfare arrangements in western countries such as pension and health insurance were introduced marginally or hesitantly. The sudden demise of high growths around 1997 broke the chain of ever-growing jobs as a substitute of welfare and revealed the unpreparedness of the Korean economy in sophisticated social welfare institutions. And the past inertia of a low-tax and low-budget economy makes it difficult the Korean economy to shift toward some another kind and so Korean presidents were afraid to note tax increases. As a result, pensions for the old are deficient and the poverty rate of the old of Korea is one of among the highest in OECD countries. News media show photos of old fragile men/women collecting papers for recycle on the street. Though Korean governments have had recognized the poverty issues and introduced welfare arrangements and have used to promise more, surely the ceiling of the budget works sets the limit obviously. And longevity and low rates of birth endangers further the virtuous cycle of production and welfare. However, the legacy of high growths in the memory keep Korean governments and people from recognizing the economic reality and still Korean governments narrate and budget a range of various slogans themed 'growth engine' in the hope of bring back the honor of the past. Illusions and inertia of the past of high growth are also hindrance to overhaul the Korean economy and to introduce realistic policy measures. 3. Politics in review As if mathematician Turing provided a test tool to validate an artificial intelligence computer, Gregory Henderson provided the concept of vortex politics to characterize the Korean politics.1 Henderson as US Korean diplomacy officer observed modern Korean politics exactly at its inceptional and critical times for 1948-1950 and for 1958-1963. The former period covers from the birth of modern Korean with its first modern constitution in 1948 to the civil war between North and South Korea. The latter covers the fall of the first ruling party led by RHEE Syngman , president and former independence leader, on April 19 in 1960 due to protests of the people against the perceived presidential election fraud (people call the event 4.19 revolution); and a very fragile interim government led by the democratic party, and the military coup d'eta led by PARK Chung hee in 1961 who persisted to govern Korea as president with his iron fists until he was assassinated by his trusted officer in 1979 and enshrined the Korean economy as developmental state. What he observed in Korea as forces underlying such turbulences was neither like tribal (as of a pre-modern nature) or like class struggle (as of modern nature). Korea was too homogeneous or centrical to be tribal or class-segmented. Factions which formed around a central political figures are in a rush to central power and drew Henderson into the idea of the politics of the vortex. Affinity of the people of each faction to the central figure was of a natural kind and so of regional nature but this regional nature is not like any separatism more as a mobilization base to stand on for central power. There were no political intermediate institutions to build consensus of vision; parties served only their central figures; local governments were only pass-through of ruling from the central government; civilian groups did not establish their independent public presence. The harsh but long ruling of the PARK's regime led into mis-perception that Korea has at least dominant ruling party as conservative and the opposing party as progressive or democratic. But the presidential election as aftermath of 1987 reminded the validity of Henderson's characterization of Korean politics. The majority conservative group split into two parties: one centering around KIM Jongpil colleague of former president PARK regionally from Chungchung; the other to incumbent party regionally from Kyungbuk. The opposing progressive/democratic group also split into two parties: one centering around KIM Daejung, regionally from Jeolla province, South-western and the other around KIM Youngsam regionally from Kyungnam province South-eastern. The coincidence of the same last name KIM from three leaders brought in the journalistic jargon of Three KIMs Era which probably was effective from 1987 to 2002 presidential election. KIM Youngsam became president in 1992 after the merge of his party and the ruling conservative party (KIM Jongpil joined too).KIM Daejung also became president in 1997 now in alliance with KIM Jongpil who split from KIM Youngsam. The personalized characteristics of Korean parties incurred revolts within the party and the parties continued to split or reform but still around mostly presidents or president-wannabe's up to now. Such a party line shown in Europe and the US does that dominates members of the party does not exist in Korea but only personal line matters and leader's personal characteristics dictates policies of his or her 'own' party. Civilian groups gained momentum from democratization after 1987 and happened to be sometimes as successful pressure groups but soon the momentum start to lose out because funding and participation of people is limited. The labor union that once was a potential force toward democratization and blossomed after 1987 also soon lost their imperatives but only succumbed to the individualized interests of members of each trade union affiliated and concerned mostly to each individual corporation. At local or regional levels, authorities or officers have been elected directly since 1995. But the budget and legal empowerment from the central government is yet low and as if the local or regional official authority is not yet called local or regional government, the local or regional level politics is yet at its early stage and people are more concerned with the central government in budgeting for their favor. The tragic fallout of the former president PARK from her misbehavior reveals again the personalized characteristics of Korean politics and the lack of balance between political forces to systemically stabilize Korean politics. Although the civilian protest during the winter of 1996-1997 verifies again the dedication of people toward democracy and the spirit of 1960, 1980, and 1987, it also confirms that the Korean politics lacks institutionalized balancing mechanism and so is vulnerable to personal misbehavior and likely to resort to un-institutional and so uncertain political events. 4. Prospect or Suggestions It is no question that Korea of the twentieth century is a successful case of nation building. But Korean people's aspiration for a better country, both politically and economically, does not seem to be, cannot, or should not be exhausted. Such a high aspiration has stimulated, motivated and directed Korean people and worked as a self-fulfilling prophecy. And we can imagine that what Korean people can or should aspire will help to shape Korea's future. This essay wishes to suggest a kind of aspirations as its conclusion. Low standards of living in Korea are not excused any longer. Economically Korea took advantage of low costs almost in every aspect, which may have been unavoidable because of Korea's lack of resources or capital at its staring point and its trajectory. And such low costs were compensated or excused by high growth. This combination of low cost and high growth cannot work any longer because Korea has already reached a mature stage of growth and high growth cannot help but be a retrospective wish. And low wages that has helped sustain Korea's low costs face a huge pressure as shown in the strong demand for the increase in the minimum wage and low expenditures on safety that is surely an critical underlying factor of the tragic sinking of passenger ship called Saewol in 2013 which left a huge emotional scar on people. But increased costs are probably negative factors in competition before they are compensated by the increase in productivities and the coordination between higher costs and higher productivities does not come smoothly and there is a danger of at least an interim trap of high costs and low productivities. In consideration of the potential dangers in increasing costs, we can be reminded that the size of taxes and budgets is yet low in comparison with western countries. The low levels of taxes and budgets surely helped high growth because they contribute to lower costs. But since high growth is not a realistic scenario and people suffer from low costs, we may have to seriously consider the idea of higher budgets and taxes which affect prices indirectly at least and can compensate for the failing markets. Of course it is true that higher budgets and taxes are not costs-neutral and in case of increasing budget and taxes and so we should keep eyes on the efficiency and effectiveness in doing that and more constructive ideas and debates will and should entail. Although there has never been a shortage of protests in Korea and some monumental events of protests had a role of shifting or shaping Korean politics, Korea lacks institutional legacy that let people participate in politics in a steady, consistent, routinized or predictable way. To common people, politics is a patronage of power elites. Consensus building is not taken seriously and many key measures are publicized and implemented by power elites and government bureaucrats. And people used to resort to a street protests and their institutional participation in politics is limited to election. The patronage politics might have helped to make fast decisions that might have been effective in the Korean developmental state. But as Korea faces a stuck in a matured stage of growth, the supposed effectiveness seems to lose its ground. While tons of policies are rushed in, the living conditions of people seem to continue to deteriorate, not to mention the chronic safety issues that are due to unsteady and unsystematic management of the society. So it is imperative that Korea should overcome the patronage politics and should participate in politics more steadily and routinely. Such a participation can be made possible through intermediate institutions other than a high level of politics. Parties of grassroots and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or labor unions are supposed to serve as intermedediate institutions of politics. But in spite of efforts to make those institutions work and some seemingly successful moments, overall those institutions have not shown a steady channel of participation and worse, seem to have stuck in vested interests and have not shown a sign that Korea can get out of the doom-saying of the politics of the vortex. And it should be admitted that Korea can overcome such a politics. However, Korea has one strong candidate as intermediate institution, not yet tried: that is, to build regional or local governments. Although are regional and local authorities that form from elections, Korea has not allowed for any form of sub-governments working in regional or local level to a degree that those governments can introduce tax laws on their own. Current regional or local authorities are dependent for their budget on the subsidies of central governments and are supposed to do what the central government assigns, which is a legacy of Korean developmental state. Lack of regional or local level of governments made Korean people aspire only for central government and made their perceptions of politics as power struggle among parties; even worse, only among dominant political figures around and for whom parties operate amid the paucity of steady participations of people. This essay interprets the longings of Korean people of 1987 and since then as a transition to a society of a higher standard, both economical and political, that may be the promise and premise of a modern country. This essay suggests to pay attention: economically to yet under- or un-used opportunities of budget capacity; and politically to intermediate sophistication of government. It is no question that there lie a huge scale of difficulties and uncertainties to transpose Korea by way of the suggested instruments and details are not easy to settle down. But suggesting a certain direction per se will be contributive to initiating people into constructive and collaborative envisions of the future. Plurality of envisions per se will be a sign that Korea's dream of 1997 may come true. Notes ⚹: This article's Korean version was sponsored by Korea Social Science Institute (KSSI, http://kssi.jinbo.net/) and published in its quarterly journal 'Trends and Prospects' (Korean)(Spring, 2018, no. 102). KIM Seokhyeon, partner of Intelligencekor, has written this article in representation of the company. The Korean version of this article is also available: Korean version. 1: Gregory Henderson (1968), Korea: the Vortex of the Politics, Harvard University Press.


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